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The exchange rate has been an important policy tool formanytransition economies. It has
served as a nominal anchorin stabilizing domestic economies and reducing inflation rate while
foreign exchange rate management has been an important element in stavingoffexternal
imbalances. Most transition countriesbegan the transition with a sharp nominal and real
appreciation oftheir currency.This was followed by realappreciation as domestic inflation
exceeded subsequent nominal deprecation over the course oftransition (Brada, 1998).
The transition process involves dismantling of old production structuresand initiating
structural reforms; as suchproductivity growth and real wages changes can be expected to exert
an upwardpressure on the real exchange rate (Halpern and Wyplosz, 1997). This is theBalassa-
Samuelson hypothesis which predicts that realexchange rate appreciation occurs in fast growing,
innovative economies. Besides productivity gains, the liberalization ofcapital accounts resulting
in capital inflows can appreciate thereal exchange rate (Orlowski, 1998 and Brada, 1998).
Finally, nominal shocks canpotentially influencereal exchange rates forhigh inflation countries.
For example, Desai (1998) argues that much ofthe real appreciation was due to fiscal imbalances
in transition economies.
Akey issue fortransition economies is real exchange rate movements.2 They play a
significantrole in alteringcompetitiveness, which is critical to their ongoing trade reorientation
toward theWest. Real exchange ratemovements can also signal currencycrisis. Forexample, in
his analysis ofthe Czechexchange ratecrisis of 1997, Begg (1998) evaluates the behavior ofthe
real appreciation ofthe koruna in the years leading up to thecrisis. Lastly, movements in real
exchange ratesmay significantly affect thebehavior ofinflation and outputin transitioneconomies.
By decomposingreal exchange rate movements into those attributable to real and
nominal shocks,one can provide importantinsight into the sources ofmovements in real
exchange rates. Such a decomposition canbe accomplished by imposing a long run neutrality
restriction that nominal shocks have no long run effect on the realexchange rate. Economic
theory predicts that such nominal shocks haveno long runeffect on thereal exchange rate. Since
real exchange ratesseemto have a permanent component, Lastrapes (1992) and Enders and Lee
(1997) use long runneutralityofnominal shocks to discern the temporary and permanent
components ofthe real exchange rate3.
This decomposition is also useful to gaugethe effectiveness ofmonetary and exchange
ratepolicies in transition economies. A significantly large temporary component in the real
exchange ratedue to nominal shocks may indicatea high degree ofnominal inertia in commodity
prices. This gives the ability to policy makers to influence the realexchange rate and alter
competitiveness. It also raises the question ofincreased real exchange rate variability inducedby
nominal shocks.
In this paper we decompose real and nominal exchange ratemovements in Poland and
Hungary to those attributable to nominal shocks and real shocks forthetransition period from
January 1990 to the present. The resulting decomposition gives an ideaabout the ability ofpolicy
makers to affect real exchange rates through monetary and exchange ratepolicies.4 The rest of
the paper is organized as follows. Section IIprovides an explanation ofdataemployed and
describes methodology. InSection ifi, we presentempirical results. Section IVconcludes and
offers suggestions forfuture research.
2II. Data and Methodological Issues
The nominal exchange rates~ is measuredby the nominal effective exchange rate (NEER)
index and thereal exchange rateq~ is the CPIbased real effective exchange rate index (relative
price ofdomestic goods in terms offoreigngoods) both expressed in logarithms. The dataare
monthly observations from 1990:1- 1998:2 taken from the CD ROM edition ofthe Internationau
Financial Statistics. Before decomposingreal and nominal exchange rate movements, wetest for
stationarity. KPSS test results indicate that stationarity canbe rejected fornominal and real
exchange rates series; however, the test statisticdoes not reject stationarity forthe first
differences. ~
While the sample period is short to assess mean reversion in real exchange rates,it is
maintained that exchange rates contain a permanentcomponent under the sampleperiod sothat
exchange ratevariability attributable to nominal and real shocks canbe empiricallyestimated.
Assuming nonstationary real exchange rates over the transition process is reasonable for at least
two reasons. First, purchasingpower parity,implying stationary real exchange rates, holds under
very restrictiveconditions and these conditions are extremelyunlikely to be met in the case ofthe
transition economies (Brada, 1998). Second, in their analysis ofequilibrium realexchange rates
in transition economies, Halpern and Wyplosz (1997) argue that equilibrium real exchange rates
should exhibit an upward trend over time asthese countries catch up and productivity and real
wages increase over time. Because such shocks aregenerallyrandom (stochastic) in nature, we
expect real exchange rates to have a permanent, stochastic component during the catching-up
process.
We can begin introducing our methodology by consideringtwo types oforthogonal
3shocks that are the source ofvariation in the observed movements in realand nominal exchange
rates: a real shock ~ (e.g., endowment, productivity shocks, technology), and a nominal shock
8
nt
(e.g., nominal money supply and/or nominal exchange rate shock). Since thevector Ay~ = [Aq~
Aq~ — A11(L) A12(L) e,t
As, — A21(L) A22(L e~1
As~]’is stationary, itcan be written as an infinite moving average in the structural shocks
where ~ are polynomials in the lag operator, L. In order to identify the shocks, it is assumed that
nominal shockshave no long run effect on the real exchange rate. This restriction canbe imposed
by restricting the coefficients in A12(L)to sumto zero;ifa~~(k) is thekth coefficient inA~~(L), the
infiniiy
restriction is equivalent to ~ ~ (k) = 0 sothat the cumulative effect of 8flt on Aq~ is zero.
Note that the effects ofnominal and real shocks on the nominal exchange rate are not restricted.
It is knownthat this method ofdecomposinga series into its permanent and temporary
components is valid provided that thejoint behaviorofreal and nominal exchange rates contains
reliable informationabout theunderlying sources offluctuations (Lastrapes, 1992).
III. Empirical Results
A finite order bivariatevectorautoregressive model (VAR) is estimated forPoland
and Hungary with 12 lags. The multivariateversion ofAkaikeInformation Criterion selects 12
lags forboth Poland and Hungary. The VARs arethen inverted to obtain themoving average
representation and restriction in (2) is imposed. After identifyingthe shocks,the dynamic effects
4ofthenominal and real shocks can be analyzedby variance decompositions (VDC) and impulse
response functions (IRF) typical ofVAR methods. Table 1 presents the VDC results forPoland
and Hungary forthe 1990-98 period.
By construction, the effects ofnominal shocks on real exchange ratenecessarily die
down; in the long run (LR), nominal shocks areconstrained to have no effect on the real
exchange rate. However, nominal shocks can playa significantrole in explaining real exchange
rate variability. Theresults in Table 1 indicates that a sizable proportion ofrealexchange rate
variability is due to nominal shocks in Poland. Specifically, at short term forecasting horizons,
nominal shocksexplain over 70 percent ofrealexchange rate forecast error variance. Nominal
shocks continue to play an important role after 36 months, which maypoint to some inertia in
relative commodityprice adjustment in Poland. This lends some support to disequilibrium
models oftheexchange rate(e.g., Dornbusch 1976)which attribute short run excess volatility in
nominal and real exchange rates to nominal shocks. The impulse response functions can sheda
light on the dynamic path ofthe realexchange rateto nominal shocks. Notice also that nearly all
ofthe variation in thenominal exchange rate is due to nominal shocks in Poland. Ifnominal
shocks areinterpretedto stem from monetary policy, then monetary policy have had a significant
breadthin influencing nominal and real exchange rates in Poland. The significance ofnominal
shocks is consistent with evidence reportedin Enders and Lee (1997) forBrazil and Argentina.
VDC results for Hungary aresomewhat different from those for Poland. Although
nominal shocksexplain nearly 10 percent ofreal exchange rate variability at a 3-month horizon,
thereseems to be no scope fornominal shocks afterone year. On the other hand, the relative
contribution ofreal shocks to nominal exchange rate variability in Hungary is much higher than
5Poland. Real shocks explain 50 percent ofnominal exchange rate variability at 1-month horizon
whilethe effect increases monotonically to 91 percent in the long run. The Hungarian authorities
seemto havefollowed a passive exchange rate policy where the exchange rate wasrealigned in
response to real shocks.
In order to assess the sensitivity ofthe results to the initial phases ofthetransformation,
we re-estimated the model with a dummy variable for 1990-91. The results, reported in Table 2,
indicate that accounting for initial large changes in real and nominal exchange rates during the
1990-91 period somewhatdiminishes the effects ofnominal shocks on thereal exchange rate in
Poland. Moreover, nominal shocks account for a higherproportion ofnominal exchange rate
variability in Poland relativeto thebase model. In Hungary,the inclusion ofthe dummy variable
does not have a significanteffect on thereal exchange rate but theeffect nominal shockson the
nominal exchange ratebecome negligible relative to thebase model.6 Overall, thepreponderance
ofreal shocks forHungaryforboth nominal and real exchange rates and the sizable effect of
nominal shocksfor Poland are evident in all models.
Whatexplains the differences in results? Certainly, the different approaches taken by
each countrytoward theireconomic liberalization provide a plausible reason. Forinstance,
Hungary, using a gradual approach, introduced partialpricereforms in the 1980sprior to the
start ofthe stabilizationprogram and, therefore, did not experiencea large,one-time increase in
its price level. Many transition countries, including Poland, followed an active, shock approach,
experiencing significantpricechanges during the initial stages ofthe reform process. Although
both countries introduced a fixedexchange rateregime, the Polish zloty appreciated morein real
terms thanthe Hungarian forint due to the impact ofthe largeinitial devaluations on the inflation
6rate.
Another potential reason is the initial undervaluationofthe nominal exchange rate in
Poland in relation to the its purchasing power estimate. Many claimedthat the initial
disequilibrium between the actual exchange rateand theirinferred value based on the purchasing
powerparity (PPP) complicated the management ofexchange rateregimes in transition countries
{Desai (1997) and Portes (1994)]. Except forHungary,the rest ofthe transition countries,
including Poland, had exchange ratevalues that are at least4-5 times below theirPPP value
measured in dollarterms. As a result, Poland had to announce largerdevaluations to eliminate
the initial disequilibrium in the exchange rate. This partlydominated the real exchange rate
movements in those economies through the overshooting ofexchange rates. Incontrast, Hungary
did not have this problem; real exchange rate movements were mainly driven by real variables
such as upgrading old technologies through foreign direct investment and an increase in product
quality and composition. In fact, Szapary and Jakab (1998) reportthat during the 1992-1997
period the productivity oflabor in manufacturing industry rose by an average of 14 percent per
year and the recent improvement in the tradebalancereflected not only increase in productivity
but also diversification ofnewexports in machinery, electronics, and other areasthat have
emerged as a result offoreign direct investment and privatization.
In order to gain an insight forthe real exchange rate developments in both countries,
Table 3 gives some background statistics on productivity, real wages, and real unit labor costs.
The table indicates that both countries experienced significantproductivity gains in the transition
period. Since firms in both countries canbe taken to be pricetakers in international markets,
productivityand real wage developments largely determinerelative competitiveness. While there
7seems to be little wage pressure in the early 1990-93, recent wage increases exceeded
productivity gains in Poland with increases in unit labor costs which slowed down the
appreciation trend in the real exchange rate. On the other hand, Hungary still enjoys productivity
gains abovereal wage increases which result in decreasing in unit labor costs and increasing
competitiveness. Thus recent leveling offofthe competitiveness in Poland and continuing
increase in competitiveness in Hungaryseem to corroborate the sizable transitorycomponent in
thereal exchange rate in Poland but not in Hungary.
The dynamicpath ofexchange rate responses can be explored by examiningthe IRFs,
Figure 1 presents theresponseofthe real and nominal exchange rates to nominal and real shocks
in Poland. It is evident from panels a and b ofthe figurethat both real and nominal exchange
rates rise by a similar amount in response to a nominal shock. In responseto a nominal shock, the
nominal exchange raterises approximately forone year and reaches its long runlevel after a
slight decline.The responseofthe real exchange rate to a nominal shock is identical to the
nominal rate for 3 months indicating short runcommodityprice inertia. The real exchange rate
declines afterthe second month,but exhibits a hump around 9-13 months before dying down.
Theresponse confirmsthe persistence ofthe nominal shock presentedin the VDCs. The effect of
thereal shock is to cause a gradual initial increase in the nominal and the real exchange rate.
While the impact effect on the nominal rate is nearly zero,the initial impact effect on the real rate
is positive. Both reachtheir long runvalue afterapproximately 15 months.
The responseofthe real and nominal exchange rates forHungary aregiven in Figure 2;
thereal exchange rate response is given in panel a. The real exchange rate exhibits a hump
shaped response to nominal and real shocksafter apositive impact effect. The response to a real
8shock is much higherand seems to increase gradually over time while theresponse to the
nominal shockdies down within a year. Similarly, in responseto a nominal shock, the nominal
exchange rate initiallyjumps then declines over time. The initial response ofthe nominal
exchange rate to a real shock is similar to the response to a nominal shock except that the effect
ofthe real shock is a permanentincrease in the nominal rate.7
The dynamic effects ofnominal and realshocks in Poland and Hungary aremarkedly
different than those reportedby Lastrapes (1992)and Enders and Lee (1997) for some industrial
countries. First, nominal shocks play a significant role in explainingnominal and realexchange
ratesin Poland and to alesser extent in Hungary. Second, nominal shocksexplain almost all of
nominal exchange ratemovements in Poland and a sizable portionofnominal exchange rate
movements in Hungary. Forindustrial countries, Lastrapes (1992) and Enders and Lee (1997)
found that real shocks explain thebulk ofrealand nominal exchange ratemovements in all cases
and at all forecasting horizons.
The importanceofnominal shocks for nominal and realexchange ratemovements for
transition economies has severalimplications. First, as nominal shocks have a sizable impact on
nominal and real exchange rates, it is important to minimize nominal shockvariability (perhaps
by following stable monetary policy) in order to achieve exchange rate stability. Second, since
real exchange rate responsesto nominal shocks imply some degreeofcommodity price inertia
especially in Poland, government policy can influencethe real exchange rate.Finally, depending
on tradeelasticities these transition economies have some leverage in dealing with external
balanceproblems arising from adverse terms oftradeshocks, suchas the CMEA shock, wherein
theCMEA trade and payments arrangementbetween theformer Soviet Union and East European
9countries was dismantled in September 1991. Forexample, Brada and Kutan (1997) estimate a
model ofCzech trade with theWest and show that the redirectionofCzech trade toward the
West was in part theresult ofexchange rate policies followed by the Czechgovernment. At the
same time, the CMEA shock played a large, exogenous role in redirectingCzechexports toward
Western markets However, authorities should avoid excessive devaluations sincethese tend to
contribute to real exchange rate instability.
Ahistorical decompositionofthe real exchange rate is given in Figure 3. The
decomposition is obtained by simulationbased on the moving average representation and by
assuming that thedeterministic trend is due to real shocks. Panel a ofFigure 3 presents the
decompositionforPoland. Notice that real exchange ratedue to real shocks seems to be
smootherthan that due to nominal shocks. Second, between 1992-95, had not itbeen fornominal
shocks, the real exchange rate would have appreciated more.Thus nominal shocks seemto have
sloweddown the realexchange rate appreciation in this period. Historical decompositionofthe
real exchange rate forHungaryindicates that nominal shocks had no major impact on the real
exchange rate, which confirms earlier results. Moreover, nominal shockscontributed little ifany
to real exchange rate variability in Hungary.
IV. Conclusions and Recommendationsfor Future Research
This paperhas offered an investigation forthe sources ofthemovements ofthe real
exchange ofPoland and Hungary. The response ofthe real exchange rateto real shocks as well as
nominal shocks is empiricallyestimated. The results show the relative importance ofnominal
and realshocks in explainingthe short-run variation ofthe Polish and Hungarian real exchange
10ratehas been quite different. In thecase ofPoland, nominal shockshad a bigger influence in
explainingthe short-run changes in the real exchange rate, whereas real shockshad a larger
influence on the Hungarianreal exchange rate.
Thefinding forHungary is consistent with theevidence reportedforindustrial countries
in Lastrapes (1992) and Enders and lee (1997)that real factorsplay a key a dominant role in
determiningthe long-term trend ofthereal exchange ratein industrial countries, while monetary
variables have insignificant, short-livedeffect. In contrast,the results forPoland imply that there
is scope for theeffectiveness ofmonetary and exchange ratepolicies in manipulating the real
exchange rate, atleast, in the short run. In otherwords, an exchange rate and/or monetary policy
aimed atmaintaining international competitiveness through realistic exchange rates by managing
the nominal exchange rate has been possible in Poland. In contrast, ourresults imply that, to
improve its competitiveness through areal exchange rate policy, theHungarian government
needs to focus on the real side ofthe economy, such as improving efficiency and productivity.
Finally, ourresults have implications formodeling nominal and realexchange rates in
transition economies. It seems, at least forPoland, the sticky-price, disequilibrium models (i.e.,
Dornbusch, 1976) are suitable in explaining the behaviorofthe realexchange rates. ForHungary,
because the findings suggest that fluctuations over the transition period in real and nominal
exchange rates havebeen primarily due to real shocks, one can conjecturethat equilibrium
exchange rate models alongthe lines ofStockman (1980,1987) are more suitable. More evidence
from othertransition economies would allowresearchers to draw broaderconclusions.
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13Table 1. Variance decomposition ofnominal and real exchange rates: 1990-98
Poland Hungary
REER NEER REER NEER
step Percent offorecast error variance attributable to
month c1
C~ C~ En Cr En Cr En
1 29.9 70.1 0.9 99.1 89.3 10.7 50.0 50.0
3 41.7 58.3 9.9 90.1 89.5 10.5 50.1 49.9
6 51.8 48.2 15.7 84.3 93.8 6.2 58.2 41.8
9 51.5 48.5 13.4 86.6 95.2 4.8 66.9 33.1
12 51.3 48.7 12.4 87.6 96.6 3.4 69.9 30.1
18 59.4 40.6 11.9 88.1 97.8 2.2 78.1 21.9
24 64.3 35.7 11.0 89.0 98.5 1.5 81.8 18.2
30 69.1 30.9 10.4 89.6 98.9 1.1 84.1 15.9
36 72.7 27.3 9.9 90.1 99.2 0.8 85.6 14.4
LR 100.0 0.0 6.8 93.2 100.0 0.0 91.0 9.0
14Table 2. Variance decompositionofnominal and real exchange rates: 1990-98 period with a
dummyvariable for 1990-91
Poland Hungary
REER NEER REER NEER
step Percentofforecasterror variance attributable to
month Er E~ Cr En Cr En Cr En
1 57.7 42.3 12.6 87.4 96.5 3.5 93.1 6.9
3 67.4 32.6 23.8 76.2 97.9 2.1 90.8 9.2
6 74.8 25.2 26.4 73.6 94.4 5,6 91.2 8.8
9 72.3 27.7 18.9 81.1 93.9 6.1 91.8 8.2
12 70.0 30.0 14.0 86.0 95.4 4.6 89.7 10.3
18 74.3 25.7 9.2 90.8 96.9 3.1 90.6 9.4
24 75.5 24.5 5.9 94.1 97.9 2.1 90.5 9.5
30 77.8 22.2 4.2 95.8 98.4 1.6 90.6 9.4
36 79.5 20.5 3.3 96.7 98.7 1.3 90.8 9.2
LR 100.0 0.0 2.0 98.0 100.0 0.0 91.1 8.9
15Table 3. Selected statistics on indicators ofrealexchange rate movements
Annual_percentage_changes
Productivity Real wages Realunit labor costs
year Poland Hungary Poland Hungary Poland Hungary
1991 -2.57 0.41 0.69 na 0.29 na
1992 6.06 5.84 -6.22 na -12.06 na
1993 5.30 5.96 -2.24 2.54 -8.20 -2.77
1994 5.22 4.01 2.66 1.30 -1.35 -3.92
1995 3.31 6.21 3.83 -5.62 -2.38 -8.93
1996 1.28 4.07 5.93 -1.69 1.86 -2.97
1997 4.40 3.41 6.71 2.69 3.31 -1.71
Source: DRI
16ENDNOTES
1.We would like to thank JosefBradaforvery useful comments. Kutan acknowledges the
financial support ofthe National Council forEast European and Eurasian Researchand ofthe
SIUE Funded UniversityResearch program. Kutan also thanks the Federal Reserve Bank for
providing a congenial environmentforthe writing ofthis paper.
2. For an excellent analysis ofthe role ofreal exchange ratesin transition economies, see
Orlowski and Corrigan(1997) and Orlowski (1998).
3. The fact that both Poland and Hungaryusedan adjustable peg should not render the
decomposition invalid. Monthly nominal effective exchange rate indices are not constant forany
consecutive months in the sample period foreither country. Moreover, given the endogeneityof
themoney supply in a fixed exchange rate environment, a nominal shock can be interpretedas a
shock that prompts a nominal devaluation.
4.Other transition economies, including theCzech Republic, are not included in the analysisdue
to lackofsufficient observations. Forexample, forthe CzechRepublic, data startin 1993, which
does not provide enough degrees offreedomto getreliableestimates using theemployed
structural VAR model. In a future study, we plan to include othertransition economies to draw
moregeneral conclusions.In this sense, ourpapercanbe consideredas exploratory, providing
an initial analysis on this issue.
5. These results arenot reported for space considerations, but they are available upon request
from the authors.
6. We also estimatedthe model for 1992-98. The VDC results are almost identical to the model
with a dummy variable.
7. Impulse response functionsfrom the model with a dummyvariable forthe 1990-91 period and
the model estimated over the 1992-98 sample yielded broadly similar results.
17Figure 1. Responseofthe exchange rateto nominal and real shocks: Poland
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